A Failure to Negotiate

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was never anything more than a precursor to the invasion of Iraq. The U.S. was never interested in putting a halt to the cycle of violence that has doomed Afghanistan for the last three decades. The U.S. was never concerned with nation-building in Afghanistan. The U.S. never had any intention of going after Osama bin Laden. There are two pieces of evidence for these points.

U.S. policy towards Afghanistan has been utterly haphazard; the U.S. has managed to consistently do the wrong thing in Afghanistan. In addition, prominent members of the administration were so eager to deem Afghanistan a success despite evidence to the contrary and were so anxious to go to war with Iraq. Even now, Republican presidential nominee John McCain explicitly contends that Iraq is the central front of the war on terror.

In the wake of recent news that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has attempted to negotiate with Taliban leaders, it is important to discuss the failures of U.S. policy in this regard. The leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, was still mulling over whether or not to hand over bin Laden when the U.S. attacked during the Fall of 2001. The Taliban were a nihilistic group, not hell-bent on bin Laden's plans for a global jihad. Omar needed time to decide what was best for his own future, even if it was at the expense of bin Laden, who was an important financial backer of the Taliban.

When Karzai came into power in 2002, he believed bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table was essential to bringing about peace in Afghanistan. He needed to legitimize the Taliban in order to marginalize them. If the Taliban had a stake in the Afghan government, they would not fight against it. But U.S. officials have always exerted a lack of courage and this instance was no different. Instead of worrying about the future of Afghanistan, they worried about their own political fortunes, and rejected Karzai's plan for the Taliban. Instead, the U.S. followed the destructive strategy of backing the warlords. The warlords' livelihoods were dependent on the continuation of the fighting. A chance was missed. Peace would not come to Afghanistan.

Today, the Taliban insurgency is holding its own. They have thus far rejected Karzai's attempts to negotiate. There's no impetus to compromise with Karzai, the insurgency is succeeding and continues to receive funds from Pakistan. The Taliban now profits from the continued fighting. Osama bin Laden has not been captured. The Taliban movement has spread into Pakistan. The Karzai government is weak. These circumstances are as a direct result of the failed policies of the United States towards Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001.
(International Affairs Edition)